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"FEDERAL" ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Colin Warbrick*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The inquiry pursued in this paper has been prompted by a paradox. In the United States, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
find any constitutional limitations upon the power of the States to allow the administration of corporal punishment in schools, despite being able to rely on the national Bill of Rights - in the interpretation
of which the Court has many times circumscribed the power of the
State governments in other contexts. The result has been that some
children have been left without redress when they have been subjected
to exceptionally severe punishment.1 Under the system of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2 recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and decisions of the Commission have
all but outlawed corporal punishment of schoolchildren. 3 The United
Kingdom, the defendant State principally involved in these cases, has
recently legislated to make the infliction of the penalty unlawful in
State schools. 4 The European institutions have reached this intrusive
conclusion relying on an international treaty, which has no direct
* Senior Lecturer In Law, University of Durham, England. This .paper started life as a
lecture to a seminar on the American Constitution organized by the Institute of European Studies in Durham in 1987.
1. Ingraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir.
1987), cert. den., 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said that
Ingraham did stand for the proposition that excessive corporate punishment could violate a pupil's substantive due process rights, reversing a lower court decision giving summary judgment in
favour of the defendants. See Mlyniec, Corporal Punishment in the United Kingdom and the
United States: Violations of Human Rights or Legitimate State Action?, 8 B.C. INT'L COMP. L.
REV. 39 (1985).
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. There are eight Protocols to the Convention. For extracts, see Appendix I.
3. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) para. 31 (1978); X v. U.K., 14 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 205 (1979); X v. U.K., 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 49 (1981). Also Campbell and
Cosans v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Comm'n H.R. (ser. A) (1980) (Right of a parent to demand
that his child be not beaten protected by 1st protocol, Art. 2). There has been no authoritative
judgment which has addressed directly the compatibility with Article 3 of corporal punishment
as a means of school discipline. The British government has paid £ 51,000 in compensation to
the parents of 17 children beaten at school who had commenced proceedings under the European
Convention. The Guardian, October 28, 1988, at 6.
4. Education (No. 2) Act 1986, § 47. The prohibition of corporal punishment extends to all
State schools and certain private schools in Great Britain.
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force of its own within the national legal system and which is a very
new regime. The American cases seem to show a remarkable solici5
tude for state autonomy.
The European practice surprises because it interprets the Convention in a way which carries the provisions of the treaty so deeply into
the legal systems of the member States, favoring a European standard
over diverse national ones. The difference can hardly be explained in
the textual terms of the standards the two Courts have to interpret:
"cruel and unusual punishment" of the Eighth Amendment and "inhuman or degrading ... punishment" of Article 3 of the Convention.
These terms are not merely very similar but are run together almost as
equivalents in Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and
6
Political Rights.
In this article I am not concerned primarily with the question of
whether the terms of the constitutional guarantee of individual rights
make a difference to their protection. The question I am to look at is,
instead, the extent to which or the manner in which federal concerns
make a difference to the interpretation of bills of rights. How is State
autonomy to be maintained against a centralising tendency of the federal judiciary (and, where the power exists, against the expansion of
federal legislative power) which extends the reach of protected rights
into areas previously regulated by the States? How is the contest between demands of national uniformity and the ability of the States to
respond to local conditions to be resolved?
These are big questions and it might be objected that it is hardly
worthwhile to pursue them in the context of the European Convention, which is not a national system, let alone a federal one (which
might be better regarded, in Professor Stein's term, as a divided power
system 7). Even so, it has to be conceded that the division of power is
vastly asymmetrical in favor of the States and is not uniform across
the range of governmental powers. 8 There is nothing equivalent to the
Supremacy Clause9 in the European Convention. What degree of direct/domestic effect is given to the Convention or to the decisions of
5. See cases cited supra note 1. See also Darden v. Watkins and Russellville Independent
Board of Education, 845 F.2d 325; Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 613.
6. GA REs. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967): "No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ..
"
7. Stein, Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-Power System: The United States Experience, 61 WASH. L.REV. 1081 (1986).
8. The division of power is judicial only. There are neither legislative nor executive functions
(save the administration of the Convention) for any body established by the Convention.
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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its institutions is a matter of national constitutional law.' 0 Although
there is the obligation in Article 53 that the States "will abide by the
decision of the Court in any case in which they are parties," the Court
has made it clear that it is for the State to choose the means it adopts
to secure compliance."I The role of the European court vis-i-vis the
national legal systems is more hierarchical than parallel (and there is,
of course, no "European" law for it to apply). As the Supreme Court
has moved to the full incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the
States in the United States,' 2 a limited analogy can be made between
the role (if not the exact legal status) of the national Bill of Rights and
the Convention. In spite of these substantial discrepancies and only
narrow similarities, problems resulting from he division of power have
been thrown up by both systems and some identity of approach to
resolving them may be discovered. This article is concerned with the
impact of division of power on the interpretation of the substantive
rights under the Convention.
II.

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION SYSTEM

The European Convention on Human Rights is a treaty of the
Council of Europe. 13 The Council of Europe is a Western European
international organization of twenty-two member States. The object
of the Council of Europe is "to achieve a greater unity between its
Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and
principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress." 14 Member States must accept the principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons within their
jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 15 The organization is essentially a cooperative one. It has a quasi-legislative function in drafting treaties, which require ratification by the Members to
10. See generally A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN Do-

MESTIC LAW (1982).
11. Schmidt and Dahlstrom v. Sweden, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 16 (ser. A) (1976).
12. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 11 (1978); Fairman, Does the
FourteenthAmendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The OriginalUnderstanding,2 STAN. L.
REV. 5 (1949).
13. 87 U.N.T.S. 103 (1951). See A.H. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS: CO-OPERATION, INTEGRATION, UNIFICATION ch. 2 (3rd ed. 1973).
14. Statute of the Council of Europe, Article l(l)(a). The Council of Europe is to be distinguished fron the European Communities, one of the objects of which is the unification of certain
aspects of its members' activities and which is sometimes spoken of as a "pre-federal" or "quasifederal" organisation. On the relationship of the Convention with the law of the European Com-

mittees, see Weiler, Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the
European Communities, in INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 113 (R. Bernhardt and J.A. Jolwicz eds. 1987).
15. Statute of the Council of Europe, ch. 11, art. 3.
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create binding obligations,1 6 or making recommendations to Members, 17 but practically no executive function beyond that of administering the organization itself. The European Convention on Human
Rights is the result of an exercise of this quasi-legislative authority.
Although only Member States may become parties to the Convention, participation is not automatic. A State must ratify the Convention and its Protocols independently of its membership of the Council
of Europe.' 8 In addition to setting out the substantive obligations on
human rights, the Convention establishes an elaborate and innovative
machinery for the supervision of States' obligations under the Convention. Two bodies are set up. The Commission of Human Rights is
charged with the preliminary investigation of allegations of violations
of the Convention, with negotiating between complainants and defendant States with the object of reaching what the Convention calls a
"friendly settlement" of the disputes and, ultimately, in some cases
bringing claims to the other supervisory body, the European Court of
Human Rights.' 9
At this distance in time, it is easy to forget what a break the Convention system represented with the established international pattern
for securing the implementation of States' obligations, especially since
the substantive field, human rights, also represented a controversial
extension of the content of international obligations. 20 In the circumstances of the drafting of the European Convention, the most the
States would accept was optional jurisdiction of the Court and optional rights of individuals within their jurisdiction to initiate proceedings against them. Each required acceptance (and that acceptance was
slow in forthcoming from some States, even those which embraced the
Convention scheme in general). 2' Although the parties to the Convention largely accept these additional obligations, in general, they have
done so for a fixed time only, so that a State's commitment to the
international supervision machinery is contingent.
16. Id. ch. IV., art. 15(a).
17. Id. ch. IV, art. 15(b).
18. For details, see Appendix II. The uniformity of the Convention regime is further disturbed by the possibility of States making reservations to the Convention. See Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 2, art. 64.
19. For a general account, see P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 53-174 (1984). See also Kruger, The Euro-

pean Commission on Human Rights, 1 HUM. RTS. L.J. 66-87 (1980); O'Boyle, Practice and Procedure under the European Convention on Human Rights, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 697 (1980).
20. See A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 80-92 (2nd ed. 1982).

21. The United Kingdom did not accept the right of individual application until 1966 and
France did not accept it until 1981. For an explanation of the UK's position, see Lester, Fundamental Rights: The United Kingdom Isolated?, 1984 PUB. L. 46, 49-55, 58-61.
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In concept, the system of the Convention does not provide a right
for an individual to have his complaint against a State tried before an
international Court, even where the State has accepted the right of
individual application and the jurisdiction of the Court. 22 However,
practical developments since 1953 have enhanced the procedural status of the individual so that proceedings before the Court increasingly
resemble proceedings before a national constitutional tribunal. What
the individual still lacks is the right to get his case to the Court. Unless the Commission or a State will take the initiative to do so, the
application will finally be determined by the Committee of Ministers, a
23
political body where the odds are stacked against the individual.
Nonetheless, there is the possibility of a binding judgment from the
Court in favor of an individual against a State, even his State of nationality. The Court has now given about 140 judgments, mainly in
cases initiated by individuals. This is a sufficient jurisprudence to detect certain principles of interpretation.
III.

FEDERALISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF INDIVIDUAL

RIGHTS

A.

Influence of Federalism in the Interpretationof the U.S. Bill of
Rights

There has always been a dispute about the "proper" nature of
American federalism but one object of the federal system is the protection of individual interests against public authority. 24 The division of
governmental authority is not an end in itself but one device by which
protection of the individual is achieved. The preservation of any particular version of federalism may be no guarantee of the furtherance of
individual interest. It was the deficiencies perceived in the existing
federal balance in the 1950s for the protection of the rights of minorities against State power and in the provision of fair criminal justice
systems in the States which provided the impetus for the judicial na22. The right to refer a case to the court lies only with the Commission and certain States,
per Article 48. Cases may be initiated by one State party against another, per Article 24, but
such cases form only a small proportion of the eighteen (total) inter-State cases compared with
13,500 individual applications through January 1988.
23. Voting to establish a violation requires a 2/3rds majority of all the members of the Council of Europe, Art. 32(1). See East African Asians v. U.K. Res DH(77) 2, XX Y.B. E.C.H.R.
642 (1977).
24. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 10 (Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Cox, Federalism
andIndividual Rights under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1978); McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design,54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1984, 1500-07 (1987). For a different
view, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 244 (1980):

".... the assertion that federalism was meant to protect, or does in fact protect, individual constitutional freedoms akin to those conventionally so defined has no solid historical or logical basis."
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tionalization of individual rights. 25
As the content of these rights has also been extended, a reaction
has set in, the perception now being that the national intervention has
26
extended into matters "properly" within the power of the States.

While the details of these oscillations may not be decisive in the European context, they do show that Federalism is not simply a matter of
intergovernmental relations.2 7 Positions are struck about the appropriate balance between Federal and State authority because it is believed that it will have different and specific (rather than merely

different) outcomes on the protection of individual rights. 28 To an extent, this is, of course, a truism. If a matter is subject to federal determination, there will be a single, national standard. If a matter is left to
the states, there is at least the possibility, more likely higher than this,
that different standards will be adopted in different states (even if 50
different standards are unlikely to result).
Until recently, the American experience of the nationalization of
individual rights has inevitably involved their expansion, that is granting the individual wider protection against governmental interfer-

ence. 29 Not all questions involve merely the individual against the
government; where the individual claims some advantage by reason of
his membership of a group, his benefit may be at the expense of nonmembers. Again, the pattern has been clear: nationalization generally
has favored the disadvantaged minority against the advantaged
30
majority.
Against this background, the proponents of a State-orientated approach anticipate that some States at least will take the opportunity to

retreat from these expanded national standards - whether the issue
25. Justice Harlan in MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: FOUR LECTURES IN HIs HONOR 59-61 (1969).

26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), probably represents the furthest point of invasion.
For a consideration of some of the problems where there has been something of a retreat by the
Supreme Court in its understanding of the content of national rights, see Welsh, Reconsidering
the Constitutional Relationship Between State and Federal Courts: a Critique of Michigan v.
Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1118 (1984).
27. J. CHOPER, supra note 24, at 250-54, is sceptical about the relevance of federalism as
contributing to the protection of individual rights in the United States, and seeks to separate
entirely federalism and rights matters for the purpose of judicial review. Experience in the
United States and with the European Convention suggests that there is no hermetic division
between the two categories.
28. See Shapiro, Freedom of Expression - Transnationaland State Interactions in the American Experience, in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
EXPERIENCE, BK. 3 249, 277 (1986), maintaining that the principal problem has not been
whether the standards that govern expression should be national or State but as to what the
governing standards should be.
29. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ch. 3
(1976).
30. E.g. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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be police powers (where a State may choose to remove some of the
national limitations which protect an individual suspect), or whether it
be minority protection (where a State may be free from any affirmative
action obligation). The expansion of the application of national standards has two bases. The first basis is principled. It is that the rights
enunciated in the Bill of Rights are the national rights of all Americans and no State has the constitutional power to dilute them. 3 1 The
second basis is functional. It is that some rights can be enjoyed effectively only if there is a uniform standard applied to them. 32 In particular, a state allowing a more capricious exercise of governmental
authority will deter the movement of other Americans into and
through the state, in obstruction of their rights and in defiance of the
other national objectives of the Constitution, notably the pursuit and
strengthening of the national market.
Both arguments assume that there are identifiable, individual
rights of overriding theoretical and practical importance. Until recently, such as assumption has been part of the received constitutional
wisdom in the United States. National protection of fundamental
rights, whether by the Supreme Court or Congress, has been demanded on grounds of uniformity and superiority. In the post-New
Deal period, national protection has embodied an idea of progress in
which the Court would provide superior standards of protection to
those found in State Constitutions through a more expansive interpretation of the Bill of Rights and in which the Congress would provide
expanding resources to make the enjoyment of such rights effective.
Congress can use its coercive powers of the purse and, ultimately, the
33
President could use Federal force to implement national decisions.
B. Relevance of U.S. Approaches to Federalism to the European
Convention System
This is not a model having much relevance to the European Convention system. First, there are not two streams of law in the European system equivalent to State and Federal legal systems. To the
extent that there is any integration at all between Convention law and
31. Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32. Edwards v. California 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 379

U.S. 241 (1964).
33. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917 (1988). There are no equivalent
Congressional or Presidental powers in the Convention system but the European Court has
found a place for positive rights in the Convention. For a recent example, see Platform Artze fir
das Leben v. Austria, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). Generally, the Court has not found
such rights to impose particularly onerous duties on the States, but there are exceptions, see
Baraona Case, 122 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987).
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national law, it is a hierarchical relationship of sorts. 3 4 Also, there is
no central power in the Council of Europe to bring the recalcitrant
State into line: 35 the mechanism of implementation is wholly persuasive, or, as the Commission usually says, cooperative. Moreover, the
functional demand for uniformity in a system of international States is
less than that within a national federal system. The European Convention does not guarantee freedom of movement for nationals of the
parties throughout the territories of these States. The obstacles and
disincentives to taking advantage of those opportunities for trans-frontier movement which do present themselves are far more significant
36
than differences in the protection of fundamental rights.
On the other hand, the presumptions upon which the consensus of
the Warren Court were built have lost judicial favour. The Supreme
Court has interpreted some of the national guarantees of individual
rights in a less stringent manner. One result has been to open the
prospect of "better" protection of individual rights by State law compared with the now diminished standards of protection in the national
Bill of Rights. 37 Opportunities for this arise where the Supreme Court
retreats from its earlier decisions. Previously State courts were compelled to follow its advance but they are not bound to retreat in unison
with the national tribunal. Where the Supreme Court finds that the
Constitution does not impose positive burdens on the States, State
courts can find that the local constitution does. Of course, this leads
to a breakdown of uniformity. There will be the possible costs in mobility. Better protection may be bought only at the price of local economic disadvantage. Nonetheless, federal protection is not envisaged
as disappearing altogether.3 8 It will be there as a minimum standard
34. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
35. Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe allows the Committee of Ministers to
suspend and, ultimately effectively to expel a State which has "seriously violated" its obligations
under Article 3. Greece withdrew voluntarily in 1970 after the Commission had found numerous violations of the Convention by the government of the Colonels. Greek Case, 1969 Y.B.
EUR. CONV. HUM. RTs. 1 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.). Greece was readmitted to the Council
of Europe on the restoration of democracy and renewed its participation in the Convention in
1974.
36. There is some trans-frontier movement, temporary and permanent, which is inspired by
human rights considerations, for example, of refugees from Turkey to the Federal Republic of
Germany, see Altun v. F.R.G., 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 209, 236 (1983), and of Irish domiciliaries
seeking divorce and remarriage outside the Republic, see Johnson v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1986) paras 59-60.
37. Brennan, The Bill ofRights and the States: the Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians
of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986). Article 60 of the Convention provides,
"Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human
rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any of the High Contracting Party ... ," clear recognition of the power of the States to provide "better" protection
than the Convention demands.
38. Brennan, supra note 37, at 552.
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that will allow the enjoyment of a core of individual rights to prevent
the decentralizing tendencies from becoming distorting.
This model is much closer to the European Convention system.
The European Court has described the role of the Convention as "subsidiary" 39 to national systems in securing human rights. This is not
merely an interpretative stance but is reflected in the structure of the
Convention. Article 60 provides that nothing in the Convention shall
be construed to limit rights under national laws. The requirement to
exhaust local remedies in Article 26 establishes the primacy of the domestic legal system as the protector of human rights. Article 13 requires States to provide an effective national remedy for persons whose
rights are violated. The power of the Court to grant satisfaction to a
successful applicant under Article 50 arises only if the national legal
system does not provide full repatriation.
While the Court has stopped short of finding an obligation on
States to incorporate the Convention directly into its national law, in
the Ireland v. UK case,4° it made it clear that it thought such as step
was much to be desired. Further, Article 13 has been interpreted to
extend the duty on States to provide an effective national remedy beyond the plain terms of its language. In Klass v. Germany, the court
said, ". . . Article 13 must be interpreted as guaranteeing an effective
remedy before a national authority to everyone who claims that his
rights and freedoms under the Convention have been violated." '4' The
applicant must be able to show that he has an "arguable" claim and
not, as the plain language of Article 13 suggests, that his rights have in
42
fact been violated.
Finally, the Court has been strict in construing the obligation on
an applicant to exhaust local remedies before bringing a claim in Strasbourg. 43 This is not out of deference to State sovereignty but to encourage recourse to national channels of redress which are seen as
quicker and more effective, and to provide some protection to the international organs against being overwhelmed by applications.
Of course, the problem is not merely one of process. National systems can still come up with the "wrong" answer. This possibility is
most marked in the United Kingdom, where the Convention has not
39. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) para. 48 (1976).
40. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 239 (1978).
41. 28 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A), para. 64 (1978).
42. Boyle and Rice v. United Kingdom, 131 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para 52 (1987).
43. Van Oosterwijk v. Belgium, 40 Eur Ct. H.R. (1980). The case is unusual in that matters
of the exhaustion of local remedies are ordinarily determined by the Commission. For a survey
of its decisions, see P. VAN DIK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note 19, at 72-84.
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been given the force of domestic law and where the Courts have recourse to its only in a limited way. 44 The doctrine of Parliamentary
Sovereignty means that there can be no domestic review of legislation
against the standards of the Convention. 45 Equally, there can be no

46
Fireliance on the Convention generating rights at common law.

nally, when a court is faced by a European Convention question, it
may fail to address it squarely or, taking the question on, get the answer wrong. 47 Ultimately, then, as with a domestic constitution, the
European institutions must determine whether local laws and decisions are compatible with the Convention; they must interpret the general language of the Convention.
As aids to interpretation, federal/state arguments have arisen in a
variety of ways. "Federal" arguments include the contentions that:
1. There is no State authority to interfere with or abridge nationally defined fundamental rights, even where the State action is
supported by a local majority or locally good reasons - if, say,
the right not to be tortured is a fundamental right, a State may
not say that a majority of its legislators or voters are in favor of
torture or, in the experience of the State, torture leads to more
48
convictions or deters crime;
2. In determining what the content of individual rights is, the central decision-makers are entitled to look at the practice in the
States and to regard strong majority practice as important evidence for resolving problems of interpretation - for example, if
nine out of ten States forbid discrimination on grounds of sex,
that is strong evidence that such should be the national stan-9
dard and that the tenth State should accordingly bound by it;4
3. Localization of rights leads to such differences in the way people are treated that it distorts natural or economically desirable
patterns of movement or, because higher regard for some indi44. See Duffy, English Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 INT'L.
COMP. L. Q. 585 (1980). If anything, recent decisions have been even more cautious than the
ones to which the article refers, see, e.g., R.V. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte
Chundawadra, Imm. A.R. 227 (1987).
45. Article 13 does not require national judicial review of legislation against the standards of
the Convention, see Young et al v. U.K., 44 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. B), para. 177.
46. Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No.2) 2 All E.R. (1979).
47. Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 3 All E.R. 54 (1973).
48. See, for instance, the arguments made by the British government in Tyrer v. United
Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A), paras. 36-40 (1978), and rejected by the Court, and the
rejection of the claims of special local historical and social circumstances in Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. See, e.g. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1979); but see Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 174 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting: diversity of practice shows that a claimed right is not
fundamental).
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vidual rights will impose extra costs of various kinds, competition will lead to a reduction of protection in the interest of
50
saving these costs.
Against these claims may be ranged the "decentralist" arguments
which will hold that:
1. The sovereignty/identity of States as significant autonomous
units requires that certain central matters be left to them to determine or, at least, the ambiguities about the reach of nationally determined fundamental rights should be resolved to leave
matters in the power of the States; 51
2. Federal or divided power systems imply a substantial degree of
diversity on important questions among the units of the system,
so that the preservation of the federal system requires that cer52
tain significant powers should be left to the States;
3. There is a national interest in preserving the leeway for States to
experiment on political and social questions (and, perhaps, to be
allowed to demonstrate that one solution is so much more successful than others that it should be adopted as a national
53
standard);

4. On many questions, particularly where rights are qualified or a
decision turns upon whether general standards are satisfied in

fact, States are the best judges, both more sensitive and more
54
effective, of such issues.
The ways in which the European Court has used these arguments
will be considered in the next section. It should be emphasized that
these are arguments: the European Court has developed no theory
50. See supra note 32.
51. Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: FederalCourts and State Power, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1485 (1987).
52. National League of Cities v. Usery 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. Metropolitan Transport Authority 469 U.S. 528, 589 (1985) (O'Connor J., dissenting); Redish & Duzin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1987); Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism; 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985); Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A.) (Matscher J., dissenting).
53. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting); cf
Roth v. Untied States 354 U.S. 476, 504 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But cf J. CHOPER, supra
note 23, at 255, arguing that the development of the nation has refashioned the functions of
federalism and "has rendered the States incapable of effectively functioning as laboratories of
social experimentation." Whatever the truth of this generally, it is less obviously true where
changing social or scientific conditions are throwing up new problems for which there is no
"right answer". See E.R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY ch. 9
(1986).
54. Younger v. Harris 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1970), in which Justice Black, writing for the court,
referred to "Our Federalism." For the view that the Supreme Court ignored these considerations
in a recent case, see Maroney, Bowers v. Hardwick: A Case Study in Federalism. Legal Procedure
and ConstitutionalInterpretation, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1223-50 (1987).

Spring 1989]

"Federal"Aspects of the ECHR

which makes any of the contentions, with the exception of the first
"Federal" argument, mandatory. What is more, the weight of any
particular argument in some measure depends upon the interpretative
context in which it is being used.

IV.

INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 55

A. Approaches to Judicial Review Under the Convention
There is no doubt about the legitimacy of judicial review as a function under the Convention, although its operation is dependent upon
the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court by a contracting State.
There are, on the other hand, considerable disputes about the nature
of the judicial review function. The Convention is a treaty. The Court
has many times indicated that the interpretation provisions of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 56 apply to the interpretation
7
of the European Convention.
States were wont to argue (and were from time to time supported
by individual judges) that the Convention was simply an "ordinary"
treaty, that participation was an act of sovereignty and that the treaty,
like all treaties, should be interpreted so as to derogate from State sovereignty only to the extent that such derogation was clearly intended
by the States. 58 If the argument had been sustained, it would have had
a repressive consequence for the interpretation of the Convention.
The general language of the Convention is such that only minimal obligations would be put on a State if the words were interpreted strictly
in the States' favor. Nonetheless, while there may appear to be no
restraint upon the Court adopting standards of interpretation in favor
of individuals, the contingent nature of a State's participation in the
Convention system is protection for the States. For most of them, it
would not be a question of having to withdraw from their commitments; they would simply fail to renew the right of individual applica55. This is not intended as a comprehensive account - neither of the approaches the Court
has used nor of its approach to all the articles of the Convention. For that, see Frowein,
Schulhofer & Shapiro, FundamentalHuman Rights as a Vehicle of Legal Integration in Europe,
in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, BK
3, 300-44 (1985), and Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Prevention
of Terrorism, 32 INT'L. COMP. L. Q. 82, 89-101 (1983).
56. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1980) U.K.T.S. No. 58, Cmnd. 7964, Arts.
31-33.
57. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) paras. 29-30 (1975).
58. See, especially, the dissenting judgments of Judge Fitzmaurice in Golder, id.; Tyrer v.
United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) para. 31 (1978); Ireland v. United Kingdom 25 Eur.
Ct. H. R. (ser. A) para. 239 (1978).
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tion or the jurisdiction of the Court when the time came. 59 The States
have further institutional protections. Although the judges of the European Court and the members of the Commission have guarantees of
independence during their terms of office,6 0 they are appointed (and

effectively nominated) by the States and have no security of tenure
beyond their relatively short terms. 61 Supervision of the Convention is
in the power of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,
62
a body consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the member States.
In fact, these institutional restraints have not altogether inhibited
the Court from adopting an approach to interpretation of the Convention which departs appreciably from the orthodox standards of treaty
interpretation. Some words of caution ought to preface an explanation
of this phenomenon. First, individual judges do not share a uniform
approach to the interpretation of the Convention, a matter of more

significance for the European Court than for the U.S. Supreme Court
because, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court often sits
in a chamber of seven (largely randomly chosen) judges. 63 Further,
the liberality or progressiveness of the interpretations seems to vary
64
according to which Article of the Convention is under consideration,
and the rhetoric of the judgments sometimes exceeds their application.65 Finally, no "over-arching" theory, in general or with respect to
individual articles, has been elaborated by the Court with any
66
consistency.
59. Only Sweden and the Irish Republic have accepted the right of individual application
without limit of time.
60. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, arts. 23, 21(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 236 (Commission); Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 39(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221,242
(Court). There is a requirement for a judge ad hoc in cases before the Court, Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 43, 213 U.N.T.S.
221,244.
61. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 22(l), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 236: Commission members elected for six year terms; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
40(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221,244: Court members elected for nine year terms.
62. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, art. 54, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 248.
63. See C. MORRISON, THE DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS CONVENTION SYSTEM (1981).

64. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1975), is a typical example of a
liberal interpretation of Article 6. The Court and Commission have been much more cautious,
for example in their interpretation of Article 14, see P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note
19, at 386-98.
65. The stirring language in favour of the right of freedom of expression and the corresponding obligation of tolerance on the States in Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) para. 49 (1976), has hardly been honoured in subsequent decisions, including Handyside itself, see, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, 19 Eur. Comm'n H. R. 5 (1978).
66. An undoubted obstacle to the development of general theory by the Court is its sheer
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The Court has departed from orthodox treaty interpretation in the
following ways:
1. It has taken a wide view of the purpose of the Convention, finding it the States' intention to establish a mechanism for the protection of individual rights rather than preserving their own
67
sovereign interests.
2. It has interpreted the Convention as requiring effective protection of individuals' rights and not merely imposing formal obli68
gations on the Parties.
3. It has adopted a progressive or dynamic approach to interpretation, to take into account changing political, social and economic
69
circumstances.
These approaches to interpretation of the Convention have become
the orthodoxy. The question now is whether they will represent the
limit of the development of the Court's approach to interpretation or
whether there is more to come. That there might be was shown by the
judgments in Feldbrugge v. The Netherlands70 and Deumeland v.
FR.G. 71 cases. Although there were detailed differences between the
two applications, each raised the question of whether social insurance
decisions fell within Article 6(1) which guarantees a fair trial in the
"determination of ... civil rights and obligations."
Deciding what are "civil rights and obligations" has been a central
but troublesome preoccupation of the Court and Commission. 72 Once
it had been decided that the national classification was not decisive,
the Court was faced with elaborating the content of what it calls the
"autonomous" concept of civil rights and obligations. 73 There has
been a tension between two contrasting approaches. On the one hand,
a majority in the Commission has generally taken a rather narrow
view of the question, essentially concerned with a formal inquiry as to
size. When the full Court decides a case, potentially 21 judges may be on the bench. Convention
for the Protection of Huaman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.4, 1950, art. 38, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, 242.
67. Wemhoff v. Austria, 7 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1968).
68. Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) para. 24 (1979).
69. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) para. 31 (1978), Ireland v. United
Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) para. 154.
70. Feldbrugge v. Netherlands, 99 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1987).
71. Deumeland v. Federal Republic of Germany, 100 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1986). See
also Drzemczewski & Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights, 6 Y.B. EUR. L.
417, 432-35 (1986).
72. Benthem v. Netherlands, 97 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1985). See also, Drzemczewski &
Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights, 5 Y.B. EUR. L. 422, 422-29 (1985); and
generally, Boyle, Administrative Justice, Judicial Review and the Right to a Fair Hearing under
the European Convention on Human Rights, 1984 Pun. L. 89.
73. Konig v. Federal Republic of Germany, 25 Eur. Ct. H. R. (set. A) paras. 88-89 (1978).
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whether the right in issue was "like" civil rights as generally understood in the national legal system. 74 This majority recognized that so
to restrict the protection of Article 6(1) would exclude completely
from the protection of the Convention many public law determinations of matters crucial to individuals but, the Commissioners argued,
that to embark on an expansion of the decisions to which Article 6(1)
applied would undermine the administrative decision-making of the
member States and would involve impressing upon them procedural
guarantees of too strict a quality. Article 6(1) allowed very little room
for manoeuvre by way of adopting a sliding due process standard. The
States had not submitted their public law procedure to Convention
scrutiny. It would be wrong to interpret the Convention as achieving
this end, however desirable it be. It was up to the States to amend the
Convention if they thought that its extension was desirable. 7 To the
contrary, it was maintained by a minority in the Commission that the
importance of some public law decisions to individuals was so great
that they ought to be taken by a procedure which protected a person
against arbitrariness or unfairness. This was the real object of Article
6 and it would be delinquent not to find protection within the terms of
the Convention, even if this meant working out on a case by case basis

76
just what processes in which States were within its reach.

In deciding that the protection of Article 6 did not extend to the
determination of social insurance matters, the minority of the court in
Feldbrugge and Deumeland adopted the aproach described above as
"the orthodoxy." The judges conceded that the concept of "civil
right" in Article 6 was not sufficiently clear to show whether the drafters of the Convention intended to include within its ambit interests
like those of the applicants. The rights were not classified as "civil" in
the national law but that could not be decisive if similar rights were
regarded as "civil" in the legal systems of the other parties. However
the minority found that there was no European standard on this classification. It then went on to apply Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties noting that:
The Court has recognized the need to construe the European Convention on Human Rights in the light of modern-day conditions obtaining in
the democratic societies of the Contracting States and not solely according what might be presumed to have been in the minds of the drafters of
74. Feldbrugge v. Netherlands, 99 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) paras. 96-103 (1986).
75. Id. para. 110.
76. Id., opinion of the minority, section II. For the equivalent debate in the United States,
see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cox, supra note 24, at 3-10.
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the Convention. . . .77
The minority judges looked to object and purpose of Article 6(1) and
were unable to discover a basis for the "[j]udicialisation of procedures
for allocation of public welfare benefits .
*"78 Indeed, they found to
the contrary because the elaborate safeguards demanded by Article
6(1) would necessarily lead to increases in costs and delays in the administration of benefits programmes. Nor was a different conclusion
to be reached if recourse were had to the supplementary means of interpretation authorized by Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.
Neither the drafting history, nor subsequent State practice, nor an
evolutive approach to interpretation could justify extending Article
6(1) to the process before the Court. In particular, the judges noted
that, ".

.

. evolutive interpretation . . . does not allow entirely new

concepts or spheres of application to be introduced into the Convention: that is a legislative function that belongs to the member States of
the Council of Europe."' 79 This approach seems to me to stay clearly
within the international (and even federalist) tradition. It recognizes
the peculiar characteristics of the treaty under consideration without
letting them overwhelm the legal basis of the Convention, the agreement of sovereign States. By looking for a "European standard," the
minority acknowledged that the interpretation of the Convention
ought to be influenced by the practice of the States if that practice
points clearly in favor of a particular solution.
The approach of the minority paid careful attention to the development of the jurisprudence of the Court. In contrast, the majority
enunciated a test to determine whether a right is public or private
(and, if the latter, "civil" within Article 6(1)) which found no antecedents in the previous case-law and none in the international practice of
treaty interpretation. The Court balanced what it perceived to be the
public qualities of the welfare schemes against what it determined to
be their private aspects. The applicants' rights, it said, were "personal,
economic and individual" which brought them "close" to the civil
sphere.80
If the source of the balancing test is not clear, neither is the way in
which it works: how does one weigh public against private factors? 8'
The proper explanation is probably to be found in the minority opin77. Feldbrugge v. Netherlands, 99 Eur. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) para. 12 (1986) (Farinho Pinheira,
J., minority opinion).
78. Id. at para. 15.
79. Id. at para. 24.
80. Id. at para. 37 (judgment). The Benthem-Feldbrugge arguments have been followed in
Boden v. Sweden and Pudas v. Sweden, 125 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987).
81. For criticism of balancing as an interpretive device, which can certainly be sustained
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ion of the Commission, which emphasized the importance of these interests to the individuals, an importance which demanded that their
enjoyment should be protected by stringent process, almost independently of the language of the Convention, the intention of the drafters
or the practice of its parties.8 2 This is not merely vehement centralisation of rights but an assertion of an active role for judicial review. If
pursued vigorously by the Court, this process will transform the Convention into a constitutional bill of rights rather than an international
83
convention.
The majority's approach will have profound repercussions if it is
sustained in future cases. It seems to mark a clear passage across the
divide, however difficult it may be to define exactly, between international and constitutional interpretation. Even on the minority's technique, the reach of the Convention into national legal systems has been
substantial and unanticipated. Of course, the States' participation is
contingent but so far there has only been the most marginal reduction
in their commitment. 84 There have been no outrageous examples of
States using their power of nomination of judges and members of the
Commission to prejudice their independence. There is no coercive enforcement of judgments but so far there has always been eventual, if
sometimes grudging, compliance. The conclusion seems to be that the
States have accepted the general approach to the interpretation of the
Convention, even in the face of some surprising outcomes of particular
cases. Their acquiescence has been the readier because the Court an
Commission have taken note of State's concerns and have accommodated States' interests, while at the same time pursuing their new manner of interpretation of the Convention.
B. Applying the Interpretative Standards to the Convention
Two different, though not wholly distinct, kinds of questions arise:
one is what role the Court will play in defining the protected rights set
out in the Convention; the other is how to establish the limits of the
against the approach taken in this judgment, see Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1987).
82. See supra note 76.
83. It should be said that the Court has demonstrated no great radical pretensions outside
the Article 6 cases. Kosiek v. Federal Republic of Germany, 105 Eur Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1986),
and Glasenapp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 104 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1986), are perhaps
the most disappointing examples.
84. The United Kingdon did not renew the right of individual application from the Isle of
Man after the Tyrer case. There are constitutional obstacles for the United Kingdom in giving
effect to judgments of the European court in the Isle of Man, Teare v. O'Callaghan, 4 E.H.R.R.
232 (1982).
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States' powers to derogate from their obligation, under the Convention, so defined.
1. Defining Rights
a. Express Words
The general words of the Convention's guarantees are not self-interpreting. For example, Article 3 forbids "torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". In Tyrer v UK ,85 the Court had
to decide whether judicial corporal punishment applied to a juvenile
by order of a court in the Isle of Man fell within the prohibition of
Article 3. In coming to the conclusion that it did, the Court said that,
"the Convention is a living instrument which ... must be interpreted
in the light of present-day conditions," '8 6 and it found that there had
developed a European standard excluding corporal punishment as a
penal sanction, a standard from which only the U.K. and the Republic
of Ireland continued to deviate. The Court was helped to its conclusion because here there was a "bright line" between corporal punishment and other forms of sentences. The Court was not asked to
determine relative questions of the "severity" or inappropriateness of
the penalty. The Commission has been reluctant to concede that these
questions raise an issue under Article 3.87 Once the Court had decided
that the developing European standard was the one required by Article 3, it could dispose of the British government's argument that local
conditions in the Isle of Man, particularly the strong local sentiment
in favor of the retention of corporal punishment, justified a decision in
the government's favor. Article 3 established absolute obligations
from which there could be no retreat even to take into account local
circumstances.
The Court has not required that the States travel forward at the
speed of the fastest. Where there remains diversity among the States'
practices, a State may well be justified in maintaining its position.
While States may experiment (by conceding to individuals more than
the Convention presently requires),8 8 other States will not be com85. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) para 31 (1978).
86. Id. at para. 31.
87. See, e.g. Kotalla v. Netherlands, 14 Eur. Comm'n. H. R. 238 (1978). See, also, Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), holding that certain line-drawing exercises are properly legislative
and not judicial functions, here a claim that an excessive prison sentence (within the limits established by the State legislature) was in breach of the 8th and 14th Amendments. See also Frowein,
Schulhofer & Shapiro, supra note 55, arguing that the need for a clear standard is not based on
the simple demand for uniformity, but on the functional ground of ensuring the effective protection of individual rights by making it clear what governmental authorities must (or must not) do.
88. An unusual example is the Swedish law criminalising parental chastisement of children.
See X, Y and Z v. Sweden, 5 E.H.R.R. 147 (1983).
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pelled to imitate the innovation; but if they follow suit voluntarily,
there may come a time when the laggards will be held to be in breach
of their Convention obligations. 89 Thus, the Court has noted the
changes in approach to the status of the illegitimate child and family
and to homosexuality which have influenced the interpretation of Article 8.' This was clear in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, which rejected
consideration about local conditions as a justification for interfering
with individual rights. 90
The "progressive" interpretation and the "European standard"
march together. The Court can find objective support for its judgments which drag along the reluctant State, where for reasons of local
prejudice, inertia, even for conscious cost allocation reasons, the State
has not kept up with the European understanding of the fundamental
right. There is little room here for recourse to the travaux
preparatoires,to look for the equivalent to the views of the founding
fathers. 9 1 The Court has concluded, and the States have concurred,
that their intention was to allow for progressive interpretation for the
increasing protection of individual rights.
It is usual to assume that a dynamic approach which takes into
account changing conditions will invariably work in favor of expanding the area of liberty free from State interference. 92 A decision
of the Commission shows that this is not necessarily the case. In McVeigh v. UK.,93 the Commission took into account the growth of international terrorism in interpreting Article 5(1) of the Convention to
uphold detention for checks to be made on travellers as part of the
UK's anti-terrorist measures, a determination which is at odds with an
earlier decision of the Court in Lawless v. Ireland.94 On the other
hand, the States cannot lightly change their legislation to retreat from
a previous judgment of the Court because the new laws would be contrary to the Convention.
The Court can protect the national interest of a State not only by a
narrow interpretation of the rights but also by its characterization of
89. According to the Court, a State which finds itself in an isolated position as a result of a
process of evolution in the laws of other States will "not necessarily" be in breach of he Convention, F v. Switzerland, 128 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987) [teit]. But, as the outcome of this case
shows, it will have a substantial burden to discharge to justify its singular situation.
90. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1981).
91. The preparatory work is not entirely without importance, see Johnston v. Ireland, 112
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986) paras. 52-53.
92. Cf., Cohen, CongressionalPower to InterpretDue Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 603, 606 (1975), discussing the "ratchet" argument about the power of Congress to
legislate under § 5 of the 14th Amendment.
93. McVeigh v. U.K., 25 Eur. Comm'n H. R. 15 (1982).
94. Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1961).
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the individual's application. If the Court finds that what the individual is "really" asking for, however he phrases his application, falls
outside any right enumerated in the Convention or its Protocols, then
it can dispose of the case.
Recent examples of this can be seen in the cases of Glaesnapp v.
F.R.G. 95 and Kosiek v. F.R.G. 96 and Leander v. Sweden. 97 The applicants were civil servants who argued that they had lost their jobs because of the way that they had exercised their rights of expression. 98
The Court said that in each case the central claim was for access to the
public service, a right not guaranteed by the Convention and so, even
if interfered with by the State, showing no violation. There is no direct
reference to federal concerns in the judgments but the Court did not
contest that a State must have some mechanism for protecting its civil
service against infiltration by persons it found undesirable. If the
Court had found that the States' actions were interferences with the
applicants' freedom of expression, the States would have been permitted to argue that the restraints ere justified on the basis that they were
necessary on grounds of national security. 99 The Court would have
found such inquiries and assessments very difficult and the States
might well have regarded them as too intrusive into their domestic
affairs.'OO
b.

Implied Rights

While the States have shown at least resignation in the face of the
progressive interpretation of the express terms of the Convention, they
have been more resistant to the implication by the Court of unexpressed obligations into the Convention. 101 The first became a serious
issue in the Golder v. United Kingdom.10 2 Golder, a prisoner in England, complained that the authorities would not allow him to communicate by letter with his solicitor for the purpose of bringing a civil
95. Glaesnapp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 104 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1986).
96. Kosiek v. Federal Republic of Germany, 105 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1986).
97. Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1987).
98. Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(1) at 230.
99. Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(2) at 230.
100. See Council of Civil Service Unions v. U.K., 10 Eur. H. R. Rep. 169 (1988), where the
Commission did look at the evidence that the British government's interference with the freedom
of association rights of a group of British civil servants was necessary on grounds of national
security.
101. See, e.g., the Swedish government's argument in Schmidt and Dahlstrom v. Sweden, 21
Eur. Ct. H.R. 16 (ser. A) (1976), which was accepted by the Court. That dynamic interpretation
does not allow the Court to find new rights in the Convention, although it can apply to the
interpretation of exprss rights and their limitation.
102. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1975).
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action against a prison officer. The government was prepared to concede only that Golder had a right to a fair trial of his action whenever
he was able to bring his case to court, which Golder would have been
able to do upon his release. The Court held, however, that there was
an implied right of access to a court, since Article 6 was central to the
Convention's overall scheme. Since Golder, being incarcerated, could
proceed only through a legal representative, he was entitled to communicate with him for the purpose of bringing the action. The doctrine of implied rights is particularly controversial in international
law 10 3 and some protection for the States is afforded by the Court. For
a right to be implied, its implication must be necessary for the enjoyment of an express right. Such implication can be defeated if it is clear
that the States did not intend to concede the particular right, evidence
for which can be found in the diversity of State practice, a factor
which has resulted in a particularly narrow interpretation of trade
union rights in Article 11.104
2.

Setting Limits to Rights

Although the Convention sets out protected individual rights, it
also provides many instances where the States are specifically authorized to restrict or even to remove the enumerated rights. Examples of
such powers appear in Article 5(1), Articles 8(2)-11(2), Article 15, Article 17 and Article 1 of the 1st Protocol. Where it has been faced with
the interpretations of these limitation clauses the Court has often indicated that they are to be construed narrowly.10 5 The different language in which they are expressed means that a single approach is not

possible. 106
For present purposes, it will suffice to examine the interpretation of
the "clawback"' 0 7 clauses of Articles 8(2)-11(2). These each allow restrictions upon the guaranteed rights to be imposed by law, such as are
''necessary in a democratic society" for the purposes set out in each
provision. In discharging the complex task of assessing the compatibility of restrictions with the Convention, the Court has had frequent
103. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151.
104. National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 19 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1975); Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, 20 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1976).
105. See, e.g. Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1980).
106. There is a very wide margin with respect to Art. 12, "... right to marry... according to
the national laws governing the right ... " Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H. R. para. 50
(ser. A.) (1986), and Art. i, "... the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of propety in accordance with the gemeral interest...", AGOSI v. United Kingdom, 108 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1986).
107. Higgins, Derogationsunder Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L. L. 281 (1976-
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reliance on the doctrine of the "margin of appreciation," 1 08 which al-

lows it to maintain the ultimate power of decision while accepting the
primary responsibility of the national legal systems for the protection

of individual rights. The "margin of appreciation" involves respect for
State decision-making based on its better functional position to assess
the situation, for example, to determine facts or to balance other interests. The doctrine is not one of judicial abstention or deference to the
national decision maker. The mere fact that the State has made a
good faith and independent assessment of the question will not neces-

sarily exclude the review function of the Court' °9 because it must still
be satisfied that there is a "pressing social need" 110 for the restriction
the State seeks to impose. The "margin of appreciation" leaves a discretion to the State, but the measure of that discretion is not uniform.
It seems clear that the institutions are far more willing to defer to
State's claims that a measure is necessary for the protection of national
security"' than they are to a State's contention that it is required for
the prevention of crime.' 12 To assist its determination of the justification for a restriction, the Court can sometimes discern a "European"
conception, for example, the need to maintain the independence of the
judiciary, at issue in the Sunday Times case," 3 and subject the State's

decision to closer scrutiny than where it can see no common standard.
It has said, for instance, that there is no common European conception of "morals."'

14

While the Court has sometimes said that regional

variations cannot be a justification for imposing a restriction,

'I

it does

not necessarily decide that, because of a restriction has not been im108. For a pioneering article which benefitted from the author's American law experience,
see Morrisson, Margin of Appreciation in tEuropean Human Rights Law, 6 HUM. RTS. J. 263
(1973); see also P. VAN DUK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note 19, at 427-49.
109. See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H. R. para. 48 (ser. A.) (1979).
110. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H. R. para. 48 (ser. A.) (1976).
111. For an excessively deferential reaction by the Commission, see Arrowsmith v. U.K., 19
Eur. Comm'n. H. R. 5 (1978).
112. See the various English prison cases, including Silver et al v. United Kingdom, 61 Eur.
Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1983).
113. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1979). The interaction
of the European standard and the evolutive test can be seen well in the Rees case, 106 Eur. Ct. H.
R. (ser. A.) (1986), where in considering a State's margin of appreciationin defining the rights of
transsexuals and the State's power to interfere with such rights the Court said that the present
diversity of practice left a wide discretion to the U.K. but, at para. 47, the foreseeable impact of
medical and social developments required that States should keep their legislation under constant
review.
114. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1976); Muller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1988). In -the latter case, the applicants unsuccessfully argued
that, if there were different standards of morals, those standards should at least be national ones
and that a person should be be exposed to restrictions imposed by the predilictions of a local
authority.
115. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1982).

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[V/ol. 10:698

posed elsewhere in Europe (or even in the same State), it cannot be
necessary in the State or region where it has been enacted.' 16 The
State must have addressed the question which is faced by the European organs. The Court is more likely to defer to national decisionmaking where there has been inquiry into the justification for interfer-

ing with a protected right than where there has not. 117 Finally, there
are considerations of what right is being truncated to be taken account
of. There is a growing practice of regarding some rights as more im-

portant than others, so that the burden on the State to justify its inter18
ference is correspondingly higher.
In Dudgeon, 19 the court had to decide whether laws in Northern
Ireland criminalising private acts of homosexuality between consenting adults were compatible with the Convention. The applicant
maintained that the maintenance of the legislation interfered with his
right to private life in Article 8 and could not be said to be "necessary
in a democratic society... for the protection of morals" within Article
8(2). The government, relying on Handyside v. United Kingdom,
claimed a particularly wide margin of appreciation to determine what
was necessary for the protection of morals. It resisted claims that such
regulation could not possibly be necessary in Northern Ireland because similar legislation in the rest of the United Kingdom had been

repealed. Social conditions and moral standards, the British government said, were different in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the
United Kingdom.
The Court accepted that this latter consideration was something

which it was legitimate for the British authorities to take into account
but they also ought to have taken into account that this criminal law
interfered with "a most intimate aspect of private life." 1 20 Among the
hallmarks of a democratic society are "tolerance and broadmind116. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1976), where the prohibited
book was circulating, not only in other European countries, but also in other parts of the United
Kingdom.
117. In the Sunday Times case, 30 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) (1979), the Court divided 11-9 for
the majority, a crucial part of its judgment being that the House of Lords had not taken into
account the interest of freedom of expression when prohibiting the publication of the article on
the grounds that this might interfere with a fair trial.
118. Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) para. 78 (1985), requiring
"very weighty reasons" to justify discrimination on grounds of sex; Dudgeon v. United Kingdom
45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) para. 52 (1981), requiring "particularly serious reasons" for interference with sexual activities, "a most intiate aspect of private life." The approach of the European
Court approximates the "srict scutiny" test of the United States Supreme Court in equal protection cases, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
119. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. para 56 (ser A.) (1981).
120. Id. at para. 52.
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ness." 12 1 Developments elsewhere in Europe had shown an increasing
acceptance of private adult, homosexual activities. Even if there were
some regulation that a State could make, the "breadth and absolute
character" of the prescription in UK law went beyond the margin of
appreciation. There were strenuous dissenting judgments, notably by
Judge Walsh who objected to the "nationalization" of the moral standard in the face of the extensive diversity of attitudes in the European
States. He said:
In my view the Court's reference to the fact that in most countries in the
Council of Europe homosexual acts in private between adults are no
longer criminal (paragraph 60 of the judgment) does not really advance
the argument. The twenty-one countries making up the Council of Europe extend geographically from Turkey to Iceland and from the Mediterranean to the Artic Circle and encompass considerable diversities of
culture and moral values. The Court states that it cannot overlook the
marked changes which have occurred in the laws regarding homosexual
behavior throughout the member States (ibid.). It would be unfortunate
if this should lead to the erroneous inference that a Euro-Norm in
the
122
law concerning homosexual practices has been or can be evolved.
He went on:
It is to be noted that Article 8 § 1 of the Convention speaks of 'private
and family life.' If the ejusdem generis rule is to be applied, then the
provision should be interpreted as relating to private life in that context
as, for example, the right to raise one's children according to one's own
philosophical and religious tenets and generally to pursue without interference the activities which are akin to those pursued in the privacy of
family life and as such are in the course of ordinary human and funda123
mental rights. No such claim can be made for homosexual practices."
The language here is redolent of that of Justice White in Bowers v.
Hardwick,'24 rejecting a claim that a State law criminalising certain
acts of homosexuality interfered with the applicant's interests protected by the due process clause. Justice White found the precedents
establishing the range of that protection referred to "family, marriage
and procreation," none of which had any connection with homosexuality. He rejected as "facetious" the claim that the right to engage in
1 25
homosexual activity fell within the concept of ordered liberty.
The Court has recently delivered its judgment in the case of Norris
v. Ireland,126 upholding a challenge to the same law as in issue in
121. Id. at para. 53.
122. Id. at para. 16 (Walsh, J. dissenting).
123. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. para. 23 (ser. A.) (1981) (Walsh,J.,
dissenting).
124. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
125. Id. at 2484, 2486.
126. Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
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Dudgeon, in the Republic. 127 The Irish government had argued that
the application of the "pressing social need" test to laws for the protection of morals led to an undesireable "Pan-European" morality and
called in aid the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers to
establish that its legislation did not exceed its margin of appreciation. 28 The majority in Norris said that the Irish government's argument was essentially for an unfettered national discretion in matters
alleged to be for the protection of morals. The court was not concerned with whether there was a "European" standard of morality but
with upholding the European standard of tolerance and broad-mindedness established by its jurisprudence. It followed its decision in
Dudgeon and held the Republic's law to be contrary to the
29
Convention.
V.

CONCLUSION

The delicate and subtle relationship between the Convention system and the national legal system for the assurance of individual rights
is a developing one. Adherence to the Convention standards and its
supervisory mechanisms are a mark of being a "European" State.
There are indications in the Feldbrugge judgment that a majority on
the Court might want to abandon the constraints of this international
relationship and aspire to a supra-national or constitutional role. The
greater good of protecting individual rights would swamp the limitations imposed by considering contrary State interest, whether general
or particular. The costs of this process, if pursued too enthusiastically,
are not only likely to be a weakening of the legitimacy of the Convention system but, in the short term, an undermining of the national
systems for protecting individual rights. As Dean Sandalow has written of the U.S. Supreme Court, "The subordination of the states has
been accompanied, inevitably, by diminished respect for their capacity
to contribute to the resolution of important social issues."', 30 One notices already a pervasive tendency of litigants in the U.K. not to be
satisfied with domestic consideration of their claims but to threaten
127. By coincidence, the governing legislation is exactly the same in Dudgeon and Norris, the
Offence against the Person Act 1861, dating from the time when the United Kingdom was sovereign over the whole island of Ireland.
128. Memorial of the Republic of Ireland, Cour (87) 117, paras. 46-55.
129. The Court rejected any interpretation which would evacuate its responsibility to ensure
the observance of the Convention under Article 19, id.. In Madisonian terms, the European
standard protected a discrete minority against local faction. For a critcism of the technique of
the Supreme Court in ignoring this aspect in Bowers, see Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Prediliction, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648 (1987).
130. Sandalow, Federalism and Social Change, 43 L. CONT. PROBS. 29, 33 (1979-80).
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(that is often all it is) to "go to Strasbourg" about any issue at all,
31
whether within the Convention or not.'
Unlike in the American Constitution the States are not protected
by anything as specific as the 10th and 11th amendments, 32 although
one might think that there are other institutional safeguards for the
States, including the ultimate sanction of withdrawal, that are more
substantial than these guarantees. The absence of any comparably
sweeping provisions in the Convention to the equal protection and due
process clauses, limits the range of issues upon which the Court can
decide. There is a whole other essay which could be devoted to matters of standing, political questions and remedies, for these too are
general constitutional questions. On the quasi-federal matter, one can
conclude that the Court has exhibited an awareness of State interests
but that the fostering of diversity as a value in itself has seldom been
referred to. The infiltration of the Convention into the domestic legal
systems has sometimes been surprising; important matters have fallen
for international decision; but as yet it has not threatened the "States
as States."
Finally, what of our opening paradox? The issue was essentially
the same in Tyrer v. United Kingdom and in Ingraham v. Wright: did
Article 3 of the Convention or the Eighth Amendment forbid corporal
punishment? The European Court used its "federalism" inquiry to
show that the practice in the U.K. was anomalous and that States had
been moving away from sentencing thier criminals to being beaten.
Furthermore, the court was able to enunciate a clear rule: no judicial
corporal punishment; no need, therefore, to assess conditions in the
State, to "second guess" State decision-makers, to leave itself having to
grapple with complicated factual enquiries. In Ingraham, there was
no such wide consensus among the States to support the Court in its
search for meaning of the Eighth Amendment. The practice of beating children as an instrument of school discipline was widespread.
The Supreme Court could not find other grounds for excluding corpo131. For a general survey of the debate, see Jacobs, Towards a United Kingdom Bill of Rights
18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 29 (1984). For a lament that the British inspiration of the U.S. Constitution has been lost or forgotten in the U.K., see THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 1987, at 19, 22.
There is no doubt that, since the acceptance of the right of individual application in 1966, the
UK's participation in the Convention has had an impact, even if indirectly, on some areas of UK
law, notably in the field of prisoners' rights; but the effect can be limited by carefully tailored
legislation, as it has been in the area of immigration. Its significance is a long way short of the
Bill of Rights in the United States and it would be optimistic to claim for it any of the "educative" qualities attributed to the Bill of Rights, cf L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY,
passim (1986).

132. Of course, the capacity of these provisions to provide protection for the States has fluctuated, see Van Alstyne, supra note 52.
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ral punishment altogether and, indeed, to have done so would have
intruded far into the authority of the States. Yet to examine each
beating to see whether it obtained that degree of severity or to determine whether it was so out of proportion to the pupil's offense as to
bring it within a constitutional prohibition could have led to a plethora
of difficult cases, which, the Court adjudged, could be best dealt with
by the States' tort laws.
In each of these cases, the question for the Court was relatively
simple but, even in these cases, federalism considerations had a part to
play in determining the content of the protected rights. Tyrer also
illustrated an important limit of local concerns. Once the content of a
right is established, good, local arguments cannot justify diminishing
it. That there was a majority in the Isle of Man in favour of birching,
that it might have been an effective deterrent were factors the Court
was not prepared to consider as justifying its use. When the Court
moved to the more complicated questions of assessing the legitimacy
of authorised State interferences with rights, the principle of Tyrer remained good: as the homosexuality cases show, a State is not entitled
to propitiate a local moral majority by seriously interfering with the
rights of minority. The limitation cases involve a variety of balancing
tests for the Court, in which various "federal" factors have been taken
into account. What the Court has largely set its face against are arguments based on the original intentions of the States. It makes it less
likely that majority prejudice or conviction in a region can find respectable support in the equivalent to the intentions of the "founding
fathers."
Courts in a divided-power system must have a proper concern for a
balance between regional and central interests. This is not just a matter of inter-governmental relations. Where the system is provided
with a set of guarantees of individual rights, the very interpretation of
those rights is influenced by federal factors. What the Tyrer-Ingraham
cases show is that degree of specific protection of an individual rights
will not necessarily be proportional to the degree of intergraiton of the
divided-power system.
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APPENDIX I

SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS

Signed November 4, 1950; entry into force September 3, 1953

Section 1 - Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Its Five Protocols
The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of
Europe,
Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December
1948;
Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and
effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared;
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement
of greater unity between its Members and that one of the methods by
which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realization of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Reaffirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms
which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best
maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on
the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human
Rights upon which they depend;
Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are
like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals,
freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective
enforcement of certain of the Rights
Have agreed as follows;
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this

Convention.
Section I

Article 2
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence
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of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no
more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of
a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot
or insurrection.
Article 3
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
Article 4
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory
labour.
3. For the purpose of this Article the term "forced or compulsory
labour" shall not include:
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of
detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5
of this Convention or during conditional release from such
detention;
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognized, service exacted instead of compulsory military service;
(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity
threatening the life or well-being of the community;
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic
obligations.
Article 5
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
none shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for non-
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compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to
secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonably suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having
done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of
educational supervision of his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the
spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound
mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to
deportation or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands of the reasons for his arrest and of any
charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph l(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his
detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if
the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in
contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
Article 6
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly
but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial
in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a demo-

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 10:698

cratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the
private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary
in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity
would prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has he following
minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of
his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay
for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of
justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in court.
Article 7
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence
under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of
any person for any act or omission which , at the time when it was
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.
Article 8
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice
and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interest of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
Article 10
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring
the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Article 11
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to
join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights
other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This
Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police
or of the administration of the State.
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Article 12
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and
to found a family according to the national laws governing the exercise
of this right.
Article 13
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
person acting in an official capacity.
Article 14
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.
Article 15
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life
of the nation any High Contracting party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international
law.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1)
and 7 shall be made under this provision.
3. Any High Contracting party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons
therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions
of the Convention are again being fully executed.
Article 16
Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing
the High Contracting parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.
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Article 17
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided
for the Convention.
Article 18
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights
and freedoms shall not applied for any purpose other than those for
which they have been prescribed.

PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
(FIRST)

Signed March 20, 1952; entry into force May 18, 1954
The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of
Europe,
Being resolved to take steps to ensure the collective enforcement of
certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in Section I of the Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4th November, 1950
(hereinafter referred to as "the Convention"),
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law
and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control
the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 10:698

Article 2
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of
any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and
philosophical convictions.
Article 3
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of
the legislature.

PROTOCOL

No. 4

TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
SECURING CERTAIN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY
INCLUDED IN THE CONVENTION AND IN THE PROTOCOL THERETO

Signed September 16, 1963: entry into force May 2, 1968
The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of
Europe.
Being resolved to take steps to ensure the collective enforcement of
certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in Section I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights an Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4th November, 1950
(hereinafter referred to as "the Convention") and in Articles I and 3
of the First Protocol to the Convention, signed at Paris on 20th
March, 1952.
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State within that
territory have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
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3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights
other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety,
for the maintenance of "order public", for the prevention of crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject in particular areas to restrictions imposed in accordance with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic society.
Article 3
1. No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or of
a collective measure, from the territory of he State of which he is a
national.
2. No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of
the State of which he is a national.
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